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and maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard, «i i uud owned and 
maintained by Salt Lake County. 
The standard of review in an appeal from a summary 
judgment is set forth in Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney, 
706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). The appellate court *view[s] the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. * IcJ. at 615. Accord 
Dwiaains v. Morgan JewelersP 871 P.2d 182, 193 (Utah 1991). 
Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the negligence of Salt 
Lake County must be preserved and all evidence tending to show 
that Salt Lake County's negligence was a proximate cause of 
Mr. Hart's injuries must be accepted as true. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
On December 24, 1986, Mr. Hart was severely injured 
in an automobile accident occurring at approximately 5800 
South on Wasatch Boulevard. An oncoming vehicle crossed over 
the center line and struck Mr. Hart's vehicle head-on. 
Mr. Hart attempted to avoid the collision by steering away 
from the oncoming vehicle onto the shoulder; however, the 
shoulder was too narrow and did not provide a usable escape 
route. Mr. Hart filed suit alleging, inter alia, that his 
accident and injuries were the direct and proximate result of 
Salt Lake County's negligent design, engineering, construction 
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and maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard at the site of the 
accident• 
Wasatch Boulevard, at the location of the accident, 
is defectively designed, constructed and maintained in that it 
does not comply with applicable standards governing road 
construction and maintenance for rural arterial roadways. In 
particular, Wasatch Boulevard does not have a minimally 
adequate shoulder on the side of the road Mr. Hart was 
travelling. An adequate minimum usable shoulder is.important 
on rural arterial highways in order to provide motorists with 
an escape route to avoid, among other things, collisions with 
oncoming vehicles crossing over the center line. The 
deficiency in the design, construction and maintenance of 
Wasatch Boulevard was a direct and proximate cause of the 
subject accident because Mr. Hart did not have an adequate 
minimum escape route on the east shoulder of Wasatch 
Boulevard, whereby he could have avoided the collision by 
steering off the travel lane and onto a usable shoulder. 
Mr. Hart's evidence, produced at the time of summary 
judgment, included his own affidavit and the Affidavit of 
J. Bruce Reading, P.E. and Second Affidavit of J. Bruce 
Reading, P.E., a certified public highway engineer. A copy of 
each of these Affidavits has been attached hereto as Exhibits 
"A", "B" and "C" respectively. Mr. Hart testified that he 
-6-
attempted to avoid the oncoming vehicle by steering onto the 
highway shoulder but was prevented from taking such evasive 
action because the shoulder was too narrow to provide a usable 
escape route. The expert engineer testified that the shoulder 
design, construction and maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard at 
the accident site was defective and did not meet the minimum 
standards for highway design and construction because the 
"usable shoulder" was too narrow. Moreover, the engineer 
testified that the defective road design, construction and 
maintenance was the cause of the accident and the cause of 
Mr. Hart's injuries. A copy of pertinent portions of the 
transcript of the evidence and argument presented to Judge 
Sawaya on March 9, 1992 is attached as Exhibit "D." 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Salt Lake County upon the grounds that there were no facts to 
support Mr. Hart/s position that the defective roadway was the 
cause, or a contributing cause of his injuries. The trial 
court held that the sole cause of the accident was the 
subsequent intervening negligence of the driver of the vehicle 
which collided with Mr. Hart's vehicle and that there were no 
disputed facts on the issue of causation. 
On appeal, Mr. Hart contends that the district court, 
in granting summary judgment on the issue of causation, 
erroneously failed to consider evidence presented on the 
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record which, at a minimum, created a genuine issue of 
material fact as to causation, sufficient to overcome summary 
judgment. (See March 17, 1992 Minute Entry of Judge Sawaya 
and Judgment and Order dated April 8, 1992, copies of which 
are collectively attached as Exhibit "E".) 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
This appeal is from the Judgment and Order dated 
April 8, 1992 of Honorable James S. Sawaya of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, granting Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake 
County's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See March 17, 1992 
Minute Entry of Judge Sawaya and Judgment and Order dated 
April 8, 1992, collectively attached as Exhibit "E".) 
III. Disposition In The Lower Court. 
The Complaint was filed on June 4, 1987. On 
January 19, 1989, the court granted Mr. Hart's Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Complaint. On or about December 12, 
1991, Salt Lake County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Hart filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on January 21, 1992. On March 17, 1992, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya issued his ruling granting Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 8, 1992, the court's 
final judgment and order was entered. 
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On May 1, 1992, Mr. Hart filed his Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Salt Lake County owns Wasatch Boulevard and has 
authority and responsibility for the management and operation 
thereof. (Affid. of Roger B. Hillam, R. at 321-22, and Tosh 
Kano, R. at 311-13). 
2. Salt Lake County recognizes the AASHTO 
guidelines as the applicable and authoritative standards for 
highway design, construction and maintenance. (Depo. of Larry 
Becknell, pp. 37-39, R. at 395-97; Affid. of J. Bruce Reading, 
P.E., at 1 3, R. at 388-92 and Second Affid. of J. Bruce 
Reading, P.E., R. at 446-49). 
3. Wasatch Boulevard is a rural arterial roadway. 
(Depo. of Larry Becknell, P. 52-53, R. at 400; Affid. of J. 
Bruce Reading, P.E. at 1 7, R. at 388-92). 
4. Wasatch Boulevard was heavily travelled with 
high speed traffic during December 1986. (Depo. of Larry 
Becknell, pp. 53-54, R. at 400-01). 
5. Traffic on Wasatch Boulevard exceeded 400 
average daily volume and had a peak of 400 vehicles in a one 
hour period. (Depo. of Larry Becknell, pp. 54-56, R. at 401-
03) . 
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6. Wasatch Boulevard in the vicinity of 5800 South, 
and particularly at the location of the subject accident does 
not comply with applicable standards governing road 
construction and maintenance for rural arterial roadways of 
this kind. (Affid. of J. Bruce Reading, P.E. at 11's 9, 10, 
R. at 388-92). 
7. The measurements taken by the Salt Lake County 
engineer, Larry Becknell, are not relevant to the issues of 
this case because they do not measure or evaluate the usable 
shoulder on the east side of Wasatch Boulevard. The width of 
the traffic lanes are not at issue. (Depo. of Larry Becknell, 
p. 47, R. at 399). 
8. The Salt Lake County engineer recognizes that an 
adequate minimum usable shoulder is important on rural 
arterial highways in order to provide motorists with an escape 
route to avoid collisions with oncoming vehicles crossing over 
the center line. (Depo. of Larry Becknell, p. 62-63, R. at 
404-05). 
9. The deficiency in the design, construction and 
maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard at the location of the 
accident was a direct and proximate cause of the collision 
between the vehicles operated by Mr. Tweedy and Mr. Hart 
because Mr. Hart did not have an adequate minimum escape route 
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on the east shoulder of Wasatch Boulevard. (Affid. of J. 
Bruce Reading, P.E. at % 10, R. at 388-92). 
10. Immediately prior to the collision, Mr. Hart 
attempted to avoid the collision by steering to the right; 
however, the escape lane was inadequate to permit travel and 
forced Mr. Hart to steer back onto the roadway into the path 
of the Oncoming vehicle. (Affid. of Richard Hart at %% 4-7, 
R. at 443-45). 
11. If an adequate minimum usable shoulder would 
have been available to Mr. Hart at the time of the accident he 
could have avoided the collision with Mr. Tweedy's vehicle by 
steering off the travel lane and onto the usable shoulder. 
(Affid. of J. Bruce Reading, P.E. at f 10, R. at 388-92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Given evidence that Salt Lake County's negligence 
caused Mr. Hart's accident and injuries, the District Court 
erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that Salt Lake County's 
conduct in failing to design, engineer, construct or maintain 
an adequate minimum usable shoulder on Wasatch Boulevard at 
the location of the accident was not a proximate cause of 
Mr. Hart's accident and injuries. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 
GIVEN THE PRESENCE OF A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT REGARDING 
WHETHER SALT LAKE COUNTY'S CONDUCT WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. 
Chenev. 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted) has 
established the following standard of review of summary 
judgments in negligence cases: 
In an appeal from a summary judgment, [the 
Court of Appeals shall] view the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. Issues of negligence ordinarily 
present questions of fact to be resolved by 
the fact finder. It is only when the facts 
are undisputed and but one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such 
issues become questions of law. Likewise, 
proximate cause is usually a factual issue and 
in most circumstances will not be resolved as 
a matter of law. 
Id. at 61£.x Noting that "[s]ummary judgment should be 
granted with great caution in negligence cases9" the court in 
Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) observed: 
In the days when contributory negligence was 
an absolute defense of a negligence action, 
summary judgment could be used to dispose of 
negligence actions without depriving a 
plaintiff of his right to a trial on the 
merits. Now, however, contributory negligence 
1. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Id. at 616, citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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is not an absolute defense, and summary 
judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for 
resolving negligence actions. 
Ici. at 728. 
Recognizing that "questions relating to negligence 
and proximate cause are generally for the fact-trier, court or 
jury to determine," the court in Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 
587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978), similarly observed that: "a 
party should not be deprived of the privilege of having such 
an adjudication of his claims unless it appears that even upon 
the facts claimed by him he could not have established a basis 
for recovery." See also Godesky v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 
541, 544 (Utah 1984). ("[W]hen there is doubt about the 
matter, it should be resolved in favor of permitting the party 
to go to trial.") Noting that "proximate causation is 
generally a matter of fact to be determined by the jury," the 
Godesky court stated: "'[a] person's negligence is not 
superseded by the negligence of another if the subsequent 
negligence of another is foreseeable.'" Id. at 545. See also 
W. Prosser, Lav of Torts 275 (4th ed. 1971). 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court herein 
purports to base its rulings on the parties' memoranda, 
affidavits, pleadings, argument and such other information as 
is contained in the record. The court expressly ruled 
(emphasis added): "uncontested facts support finding that 
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accident and plaintiff's damages were the result of and solely 
caused by the intervening negligence of defendant Robert L. 
Tweedy.» (See March 17, 1992 Minute Entry of Judge Sawaya and 
Judgment and Order dated April 8, 1992, copies of which are 
collectively attached as Exhibit "E".) 
Notwithstanding the trial court's conclusion, the 
question of whether or not Salt Lake County's conduct in 
negligently maintaining and operating Wasatch Boulevard was a 
direct and proximate cause of Mr. Hart's accident and injuries 
is a contested material fact. In support of this contention, 
Mr. Hart submitted the Affidavits of J. Bruce Reading, an 
expert witness whose credentials disclose that he, by 
education, training and experience, is familiar wirn the 
standards applicable to and which govern the design, 
construction, modification and maintenance of state and county 
roadways in Utah. After reciting the factual basis upon which 
he formed his opinion, Mr. Reading testified, inter alia, 
that: 
(a) Wasatch Boulevard at 5800 South does 
not comply with AASHTO standards and is 
defective with respect to safety considerations 
because of the lack of an adequate minimum 
usable shoulder. The design, construction and 
condition of Wasatch Boulevard . . . as 
negligent and deviated from the minimum 
acceptable standards of roadway design 
construction and maintenance. (Affid. of J. 
Bruce Reading, P.E. at 1 9, R. at 388-92). 
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(b) [T]he deviation from minimum 
standards of the shoulder at 5800 South Wasatch 
Boulevard was a direct and proximate cause of 
the accident in which Mr. Hart was injured 
because it did not allow an adequate escape 
route for Mr. Hart to avoid the collision. 
(Affid. of J. Bruce Reading, P.E. at 1 10, R. 
at 388-92.) 
The Affidavit of Richard Hart is consistent with the 
opinions and conclusions of Mr. Reading. Mr. Hart has 
provided sworn testimony that: 
(a) As I approached the approximate 
location of 5800 South on Wasatch Boulevard, I 
was following behind another vehicle when I 
observed an oncoming vehicle cross over the 
center line and collide with the vehicle in 
front of mine. (Affid. of Richard Hart at 
1 4, R. at 443-45.) 
(b) As I made these observations, I had 
only a very brief time to react. However, I 
immediately reacted by steering to the right 
in an effort to avoid a collision with the 
vehicles in front of me. Unfortunately, 
Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 5800 South 
only had one lane of traffic in either 
direction and there was not an adequate 
shoulder lane to allow escape on the right 
side of the road. (Affid. of Richard Hart at 
1 5, R. at 443-45.) 
(c) Because of the narrowness of the 
right (east) shoulder, I had to steer back 
across my lane of traffic to the left and 
could not avoid collision with the oncoming 
vehicle. (Affid. of Richard Hart at 1 6, R. 
at 443-45.) 
(d) I believe that if an adequate 
shoulder had been available to the right side 
of Wasatch Boulevard at the scene of the 
accident, I could have avoided the collision 
and would not have sustained any injuries. 
(Affid. of Richard Hart at J 7, R. at 443-45.) 
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These Affidavits clearly raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether or not Salt Lake County's 
maintenance of and operation of Wasatch Boulevard was a direct 
and proximate cause of Mr. Hart's accident and injuries. 
These Affidavits, standing alone, create a material fact issue 
in favor of Mr. Hart. "A single sworn statement is sufficient 
to create an issue of fact. Clearly, it is not for a court to 
weigh the evidence or assess probability." Webster v. Sill, 
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The facts in the case at bar are strikingly similar 
to the facts of Jensen v. Mountain States Tel.and Tel. Co., 
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980) and plaintiff submits that Jensen 
should control the result in this appeal. In Jensen, 
plaintiff was injured when the car he was operating collided 
with a car operated by a defendant not party to the appeal, 
which turned left into plaintiff's path. Mountain States' 
service van was parked in a position to obstruct the lane of 
traffic. The trial court granted summary judgment for 
Mountain States finding that Mountain States' conduct was not 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries because the 
operator of the other vehicle constituted an independent 
intervening cause which cut off the negligence of Mountain 
States. In reversing the summary judgment, the Supreme Court 
held: 
-16-
[I]n a situation involving independent 
intervening causes, the primary issue is one 
of the forseeability of the subsequent 
negligent conduct of a third party, and in 
this case, that issue must be resolved by the 
finder of fact. 
Id. at 365. 
Notably, the only legal authority cited by Salt Lake 
County in support of its argument to the trial court, the case 
of Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 467 P.2d 45 (Utah 
1970), actually supports Mr. Hart's argument. In Anderson, 
the plaintiff sued for injuries suffered when a car in which 
he was riding as a guest ran into the rear of defendant's 
cement trucks which was parked on the street. Plaintiff 
argued that the defendant was negligent in parking its truck 
and that such negligence was a "concurring proximate cause of 
his injuries." In dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the court 
discussed the legal standard as follows: 
[W]here one is injured by the concurrent 
negligence of two wrongdoers he can recover 
from either or both; and this includes 
circumstances where one has previously 
created a dangerous condition, which 
combines with a later act of negligence, if 
the former is in fact a concurring proximate 
cause. But this is not so if the previously 
created dangerous condition is such that the 
later actor, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, should have observed and avoided it, 
in which instance the later act of 
negligence is an independent intervening and 
therefore sole proximate cause. 
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Id. at 46. In concluding that plaintiff should have observed 
and avoided the cement truck and that defendant's conduct, 
therefore, was not a proximate cause of the accident, the 
court relied upon the undisputed testimony that the subject 
collision "occurred in the middle of the afternoon in broad 
daylight on a clear day, and there was nothing either to 
obstruct the vision or distract the attention of the host-
driver [from] this large Red-E-Mix truck standing there 'as 
big as life and twice as natural' on the street.* £d. at 47. 
Unlike the Anderson case, the instant accident 
occurred at night in difficult driving conditions and involved 
negligent decision making, actions or omissions, whereby an 
unforeseeable and dangerous condition was permitted to exist 
on a major Salt Lake County thoroughfare. The defective and 
unsafe condition of Wasatch Boulevard could not have been 
known or observable to Mr. Hart and afortiori could not be 
easily avoided by him. Inasmuch as evidence regarding whether 
or not defendant Salt Lake County's conduct in managing and 
operating the Wasatch Boulevard Highway System was negligent 
and whether or not such negligence was a proximate cause of 
Mr. Hart's injuries is genuinely disputed by the parties, this 
matter should be submitted to the trier of fact. 
Whether Salt Lake County's alleged negligence caused 
Mr. Hart's accident is properly a question for the jury. From 
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the evidence before the trial court, a jury could reasonably 
find that Salt Lake County's negligent conduct was a direct 
and proximate cause of Mr, Hart's accident and injuries. 
Inasmuch as the trial court invaded the province of the jury 
in granting Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the judgment and order should be reversed and this matter 
should be remanded for a jury trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The presence of a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether the condition of Wasatch Boulevard at the 
time of the accident was a proximate cause of Mr. Hart's 
injuries precludes summary judgment herein. Accordingly, the 
District Court's entry of Summary Judgment should be reversed 
and Mr. Hart should be afforded his right to present evidence 
establishing the liability of Appellee Salt Lake County to the 
finder of fact. 
DATED this !23 day of November, 1992. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Evan A. SchmutzA Esq. 
Wm. Kelly Nash, Esq. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be hand-delivered, 
a copy of the foregoing APPEAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT this 22. day of November, 1992, to the 
following: 
David 0. McKnight 
Deputy County Attorney 
County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
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Exhibit A 
Evan A. Schmutz, #3860 
Wm. Kelly Nash, #4888 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. HART, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
ROBERT L. TWEEDY, ROBERT E. ] 
TWEEDY, JOHN DOES 1 ] 
THROUGH 10, UTAH DEPARTMENT ) 
OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF ) 
UTAH, and SALT LAKE COUNTY ; 
COMMISSION, ] 
Defendants. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD HART 
Civil NO. C-87-3796 
i Judge James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF HAWAII ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ^ri\iXu ) 
Richard S. Hart, having been duly sworn and upon his 
oath states as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above entitled action 
and make the following statements of my own personal knowledge. 
2. I recall the events of December 24, 1986. 
3. At approximately 7:05 p.m., I was operating a 
motor vehicle and proceeding north bound on Wasatch Boulevard. 
4. As I approached the approximate location of 5800 
South on Wasatch Boulevard, I was following behind another 
vehicle when I observed an oncoming vehicle cross over the 
center line and collide with the vehicle in front of mine. 
5. As I made these observations, I had only a very 
brief time to react. However, I immediately reacted by 
steering to the right in an effort to avoid a collision with 
the vehicles in front of me. Unfortunately, Wasatch Boulevard 
at approximately 5800 South only had one lane of traffic in 
either direction and there was not an adequate shoulder lane to 
allow escape on the right side of the road. 
6. Because of the narrowness of the right (east) 
shoulder, I had to steer back across my lane of traffic to the 
left and could not avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle. 
7. I believe that if an adequate shoulder had been 
available to the right side of Wasatch Boulevard at the scene 
of the accident, I could have avoided the collision and would 
not have sustained any injuries. 
DATED this 2Q!&ay of February, 1992. 
Richard S. Hart 
(WA4A& 
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STATE OF HAWAII 
COUNTY OF UfluXH'i 
SS 
) 
On this day of February, 1992, personally 
appeared before me Richard S. Hart, the signer of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
(SEAL) 
My commission Expires: 
CAAJ*)K.I [ ^ Notary Public 
Residing at: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be hand delivered a 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Richard S. Hart this <)H day 
of February, 1992, to the following: 
David 0. McKnight 
Deputy County Attorney 
County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Wendell E. Bennett, Esq, 
448 East 400 South, Ste. 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Wm. Kelly Nash, #4888 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
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Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. HART, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. TWEEDY, ROBERT E. 
TWEEDY, JOHN DOES 1 ] 
THROUGH 10, UTAH DEPARTMENT ] 
OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF ] 
UTAH, and SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
COMMISSION, ) 
Defendants. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF 
i J. BRUCE READING, P.E. 
Civil NO. C-87-3796 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
1. My name is J. Bruce Reading. I am a professional 
engineer and make the statements contained herein of my own 
personal knowledge. 
2. I was employed as an engineer for two years with 
the Utah Department of Transportation, traffic engineering 
division. I also worked for two years as assistant city 
traffic engineer for Salt Lake City Corporation. By education, 
training and experience I am familiar with the standards 
applicable to and which govern the design, construction, 
modification and maintenance of roadways in the State of Utah 
and each of its counties. 
3. The applicable standard which the state of Utah 
and each of its counties follow in the design, construction, 
modification and maintenance of roadways is contained in "A 
Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets", published 
by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO). 
4. I am familiar with the AASHTO standards and 
guidelines and consider myself an expert in the application and 
interpretation of such standards. 
5. I made a field investigation of the location of 
the accident involving vehicles driven by Robert Tweedy and 
Richard Hart, which occurred on Wasatch Boulevard at 
approximately 5800 South. I have also reviewed the Sheriff's 
report of the accident and have spoken with Richard Hart about 
the accident. 
6. As a professional highway engineer, it is my 
opinion that I have obtained and reviewed facts and information 
of the nature and character which are typically used by 
professionals and experts in my field of expertise as a basis 
upon which we form expert opinions and testimony concerning the 
causes of vehicular accidents. 
-2-
7. In my opinion, AASHTO standards define Wasatch 
Boulevard as a "rural arterial highway" having an average daily 
volume of more than 400 vehicles and an hourly peak volume of 
4 00 or more vehicles. Wasatch Boulevard had a speed limit of 
50 m.p.h. at the time of the accident. Under these 
circumstances, AASHTO requires a minimum of 10 feet of usable 
shoulder. 
8. During my field investigation of the accident 
site, I measured the shoulder dimensions on the east side of 
Wasatch Boulevard and found that the usable shoulder was only 
five feet. Beyond that five foot shoulder, the land slopes 
steeply and the character of the material is completely 
inadequate to give stable support to a vehicle which might 
leave the roadway under emergency conditions. 
9. In my opinion, Wasatch Boulevard at 5800 South 
does not comply with AASHTO standards and is defective with 
respect to safety considerations because of the lack of an 
adequate minimum usable shoulder. The design, construction and 
condition of Wasatch Boulevard at the date of the accident was 
negligent and deviated from the minimum acceptable standards of 
roadway design construction and maintenance. 
10. In my opinion, the deviation from minimum 
standards of the shoulder at 5800 South Wasatch Boulevard was a 
direct and proximate cause of the accident in which Mr. Hart 
-3-
was injured because it did not allow an adequate escape route 
for Mr. Hart to avoid the collision. 
DATED this day of January, 1992. 
^c 
ce "Reading, P.E. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of 
January, 1992• 
Notary Pubi.c , '/-[ . /I 
50 South Main *j i
 %r W***+ • '*£> »L I ^Wfri^r, 
Salt Lake city uta^ . 4 ' Notary Public-' r My Commission E>: ;., J R f t s i d i n a a t JLC LJ T 
May 23t 19£5 j W 5 i a i n 9 a t ^ /—^U-L State ot Utah . 
My (foliinrs^rrtffTlS^ir^T^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SgRVlCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be hand delivered a 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of J. Bruce Reading, P.E. this 
JJ >^day of January, 1992, to the following: 
David 0. McKnight 
Deputy County Attorney 
County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Wendell E. Bennett, Esq. 
448 East 400 South, Ste. 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. HART, | 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
ROBERT L. TWEEDY, et al., 
Defendants. 
i SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
| J. BRUCE READING, P.E. 
Civil No. C-87-3796 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Your affiant, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. That he has reviewed the first and second affidavits 
of Larry Becknell, the second affidavit of Tosh Kano, the defendant 
Salt Lake County's reply to plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to 
motion for summary judgment, and the affidavit of Roger B. Hillam 
in the above-entitled matter. 
2. Roger Hillam supplied a right-of-way plat showing 
that the portion of Wasatch Boulevard pertaining to this accident 
site was dedicated on November 20, 1950. It appears the dedicated 
right-of-way is fifty (50) feet in width. 
3. When your affiant measured the width of the existing 
roadway from the eastern edge of the northbound graded gravel 
shoulder to the western edge of the southbound graded shoulder, he 
found the distance to be sixty-three (63) feet. 
4. Based upon the affidavit of Tosh Kano, in the last 
fifteen (15) years there has only been a resurfacing project on 
this portion of the roadway. 
5. This would indicate, to your affiant, that the 
construction to increase the right-of-way width happened earlier 
than fifteen (15) years ago but after its dedication. 
6. Your affiant's opinion that the shoulder does not 
meet standar4s is based on the AASHTO's publication entitled A 
Policy on Geometric Design of Rural Highways that was first 
published as separate pamphlets and incorporated into the first 
"Blue Book" in 1954, which was revised in the 1965 edition of the 
same publication, with the final revision (before this accident 
occurred) being published in 1984. 
7. In Salt Lake County's reply to plaintiff's 
memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment they refer 
to and cite from the forward of the 1984 edition of A Policy on 
Geometric Design of Rural Highways. The relevant cite, at page 
x/vii, states: 
This publication is intended to 
provide guidance in the design of 
new and major reconstruction 
projects. It is not intended as a 
policy for resurfacing, restoration, 
or rehabilitation (R.R.R.) projects. 
8. This statement is contained in none of the previous 
AASHTO manuals. In fact, the R.R.R. projects refer to specific 
federally funded projects for existing facilities. In the forward 
to the 1990 edition of A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and 
Streets even these projects need to conform to AASHTO standards if 
certain criteria are met. 
9, You affiant concurs with the second affidavit of 
Larry Becknell wherein he states that there is a paved portion of 
roadway outside of the east edge line of the travelway. This 
portion is usually not included in the calculation of shoulder 
area. There exists approximately four (4) feet of pavement. Under 
the 1965 AASHTO standard, the following applies: 
In general a width of 10 feet is a 
desirable minimum. Heavily traveled 
and high speed highways should have 
a graded shoulder at least 10 feet 
and preferably 12 feet wide . . . . 
Shoulder strips, surfaced sections, 
2 to 4 feet wide, at the edge of 
through traffic lanes, are not 
intended to serve as shoulders but 
rather as a maintenance and a safety 
element of a wider shoulder. 
Reading/Affidavit 
Page 3 
r\ r\ C\ A A ft 
10 • Only five (5) feet of shoulder exists at the 
location. Such is below standard. 
11. Your affiant would concur that the AASHTO standards 
are basically for new construction, but they are also viewed by the 
traffic engineering profession as the desirable condition for all 
roadways and a condition to which roadway systems should be 
upgraded. This particular road has been out of conformity since at 
least 1950. There exists a 26 foot graded shoulder from the west 
edge of Wasatch Boulevard,s pavement. Given this 2 6 feet, there is 
more than sufficient room to position the highway to allow the 
requisite shoulder area on the east side of the road. 
DATED this 3 day of March, 1992. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c^7 day of 
March, 1992. 
Notary Public 
Reading/Affidavit 
Page 4 
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March 9, 1992 
THE COURT: Hart vs. Tweedy. Anybody here on 
that? 
MR. NASH: Kelly Nash in behalf of the plaintiff. 
MR. MCKNIGHT: David McKnight. 
THE COURT: As I recall, it is Salt Lake's motion 
for a summary judgment in the case brought against the 
county for negligent something or other, design, 
maintenance, upkeep et cetera, et cetera. 
MR. NASH: That is right. 
THE COURT: Mr. McKnight, it is your motion for 
— you may proceed. 
MR. MCKNIGHT: This case happened at Wasatch 
Boulevard 5800 South. This highway was not designed but it 
was dedicated to Salt Lake County in 1950, unaware it was 
designed even when the highway was constructed, since it 
was dedicated to Salt Lake County. This portion of the 
highway was — has only been maintained by the county. 
Material facts to this action is in this area Wasatch 
Boulevard 5800 South has an east lane that was measured to 
be thirteen feet wide and according to the plaintiff's 
affidavits submitted by the plaintiff, the paved edge of 
the highway has a four feet width and the unpaved usable 
shoulder is nine feet wide. Speed limit is fifty miles per 
hour. On December 24, 1986 around seven p.m., plaintiff, 
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Mr. Hart, was travelling north in the east lane in a Toyota 
Landcruiser in what he described was a safe speed in the 
complaint, safe side on — 
THE COURT: Which direction. 
MR. MCKNIGHT: Travelling north. He would been 
in the east lane portion of the highway. There was a 
Volkswagen van in front of the plaintiff. While the 
Volkswagen van and plaintiff were approaching 5800 South, a 
Ford Bronco travelling south over the fifty miles an hour 
speed limit driven by an intoxicated driver, Mr. Tweedy, 
crossed over into the lane. As a result, Mr. Tweedy 
collided with the driver's side oncoming Volkswagen van, 
spinning and it rested in the west lane. 
THE COURT: Collision took place in the east 
lane? 
MR. MCKNIGHT: Collision took place around the 
center line, then the Volkswagen ended up in the west lane. 
The plaintiff and Mr. Tweedy then collided head-on just 
west of the center line. The investigation of the accident 
revealed no skid marks or other evidence. The defendant 
tried to avoid the accident. The plaintiff admits in his 
affidavit that having only a very brief time to react and 
he verifies the investigator's conclusion that the 
collision occurred next to the center line. Mr. Hart 
states in his affidavit, he drove away from the shoulder, 
rr^MTSTTm'D'DT'T'Cir* (Tra»»TO/-«T>TTMTI 
J 
crossed the lane into the collision. Plaintiff also 
asserts that he steered across the lane because of the 
narrow shoulder. I believe that is the crux of this case. 
The county, Your Honor, believes—asserts that there's only 
one credible conclusion you can draw from that accident, 
that there was no time for Mr. Hart to avoid collision with 
the truck driver who pulled into his lane and that the road 
itself and condition of the highway had actually nothing to 
do with the accident. We believe that the facts are clear 
and can lead to no other conclusion, first of all, the 
investigator's conclusion where there was no skid marks or 
evidence of evasive action, the fact that Mr. Tweedy was 
travelling over fifty miles an hour in speed and although 
he never provided with what the speed the plaintiff felt he 
was going, he represents it as being a safe speed on a 
fifty miles per hour highway so about thirty, forty-five, 
whatever you want to say is a safe speed. We have two 
moving vehicles coming toward each other. We feel those 
facts alone should make it clear that the condition of the 
highway had nothing to do with this accident. However, 
certainly some other facts could be discussed, many which 
haven't been supplied by the plaintiff in his affidavits, 
in his response and memorandum. One fact that the 
plaintiff has provided is he's measured a four-foot paved 
road edge. That is, there was four feet beyond the line 
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that marked the lane and there was five feet of usable 
unpaved shoulder, so that would make a total of nine feet 
beyond the lane itself. The lane has been measured at 
thirteen feet. A Bronco—I assume a Bonco is around six 
feet wide. For the argument, I will say the Bonco is seven 
feet wide so what we have is a total of fifteen feet 
unobstructed usable surface. We have a fifteen foot 
highway with perhaps a seven foot vehicle and nine foot 
shoulder and edge of the road. That makes fifteen feet, 
that the Volkswagen since — when it collided, it ended up 
in the west lane, didn't provide an obstruction of the 
accident to the plaintiff. So plaintiff has not been able 
to offer any explanation that we believe could create a 
material issue of fact. If he had time to avoid the 
accident why fifteen feet ununobstructable usable highway 
was inadequate for him to avoid. If he had time to avoid 
the accident, why didn't he choose that space, if he had 
the time to avoid this accident? Therefore, we feel the 
only plausible theory to their answer, he didn't have 
enough time to react. If the plaintiff had time to react, 
we feel the county should not be liable because the 
plaintiff chose to ignore fifteen feet of space. He chose 
to drive across the lane into the accident. So we feel the 
shoulder of the road is irrelevant in this case. Even so 
if the shoulder was relevant the county feels as a matter 
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of law does not constitute a dangerous condition. Even the 
facts taken as the plaintiff alleges, we have nine feet of 
drivable edge and road surface and shoulder surface beyond 
the highway itself where one could avoid an obstruction. 
Plaintiff sites the AASHTO standards a lot. AASHTO 
standards do not delineate what a dangerous condition is. 
They provide standards in new construction of highways and 
the county did not construct its highway, only maintained 
its highway. AASHTO also allows for variances on road 
size. Then like I mentioned, we believe the AASHTO 
standards and the condition of the road is irrelevant in 
this case. We feel this case is clear cut. There is no 
competent evidence that raise as a material issue of fact 
that this road had anything to do with the accident. We 
ask for a summary judgment in the county's favor. Thank 
you. 
MR. NASH: Your Honor, Utah law does recognize 
for a nonmoving party to successfully oppose a motion for a 
summary judgment, in fact, if you send a case to the jury, 
it is not necessary for us to prove at this juncture in its 
entirety, I believe, what is alleged. It is only necessary 
for us to show facts that controvert those facts that — 
factors competent in the affidavits. 
THE COURT: It is not clear to me, Mr. Nash. How 
do you claim this accident happened? I am not quite sure 
in my mind what happened here. You have got two drivers, 
Mr. Hart and Mr. Tweedy. Is there a third vehicle? 
MR. NASH: There's a third vehicle involved that 
was referred to by Mr. McKnight preceding Mr. Hart's 
vehicle travelling northbound on Wasatch Boulevard. 
Apparently, Mr. Tweedy was intoxicated at the time and in 
fact I think the record is pretty clear that he was 
negligent and was cited for a whole list of violations of 
the code in his operation of his vehicle. He crossed 
across the center line and apparently struck the vehicle 
driven preceding Mr. Hart's vehicle, which began to spin. 
And at that point, Mr. Hart having some period of time to 
try to avoid the accident, began to go to the right, came 
back, collided head-on with Mr. Tweedy's vehicle which came 
beyond the initial impact and came into contact with Mr. 
Hart's vehicle. 
THE COURT: What did the county do to cause that 
accident? 
MR. NASH: It is alleged, Your Honor, that the 
county was negligent in the maintenance and operation of 
Wasatch Boulevard. 
THE COURT: What did they fail to do? 
MR. NASH: The facts are very clear. As is 
stated earlier, the county owned it, was responsible for 
it. They did acquire it by dedication in approximately 
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1950. Since that time they have maintained it. Salt Lake 
County has recognized as applicable the so-called AASHTO 
standards or guidelines as authoritative for highway 
design, construction and maintenance. Those standards very 
clearly set forth minimum usable shoulder requirements 
which provide a motorist an alternative escape route to 
avoid accidents of this nature. It is alleged that in fact 
the county in its maintenance of that road failed 
negligently to maintain, operate and upgrade or modify that 
roadway of its known dangerous condition. 
THE COURT: By failing to maintain a shoulder 
adequately? 
MR. NASH: No adequate escape route is the thrust 
of the claim. And the factual dispute arises primarily as 
a result of the testimony and affidavits of plaintiff's 
expert and experts of the others as well of Mr. Hart, 
himself—let me refer to statements of Mr. Hart, the 
plaintiff. He has indicated and I think correctly refered 
to by counsel that he had only a very brief time to react. 
Nevertheless, he did have some time to react, 
indicates—and I quote his affidavit, "I immediately 
reacted by steering to the right in an effort to avoid the 
collision with the vehicles in front of me. Unfortunately 
Wasatch Boulevard only had one lane of traffic in each 
direction. There was not adequate shoulder lane to allow 
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escape on the right side of the road. Because of the 
narrowness of the east or right shoulder of that northbound 
lane, I had to steer back across the traffic to the left, 
could not avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle, which 
in fact would be driven by Mr. Tweedy. 
THE COURT: Is there a standard that requires a 
shoulder, adequate lane to provide an escape route? 
MR. NASH: Yes there is. That is really 
underscored by the testimony of Mr. Bruce Reading 
factually— 
THE COURT: Not our Bruce Reading — 
MR. NASH: He is also an attorney in the state. 
His background, however, is one of engineering study. 
Factually, he was employed with the Utah Department of 
Transportation for two years and worked actively in the 
traffic engineering division of the department. He also 
worked as city traffic engineer for Salt Lake City 
Corporation, so he has a wealth of experience in traffic 
engineering. Then of course by education and training and 
experience, he has acquired a familiarity with the 
standards applicable to design, construction and 
maintenance of county roadways such as Wasatch Boulevard. 
It is his testimony that the applicable standard is 
contained in the policy Geometric Design of Highways and 
Streets, which is published by AASHTO. And this particular 
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publication makes reference to the standards as follows in 
addition to the — I will recite those here in his 
affidavit. In addition, he has done field investigation 
and has obtained personal knowledge of the particular 
circumstances, dimensions and et cetera, has verified 
those, has compared those to the AASHTO standards. It is 
his expert opinion that Wasatch Boulevard is—in fact, this 
is undisputed I believe by the defendant, it is classified 
as a rural arterial highway under the code. It has an 
average daily volume of more than four hundred vehicles and 
peak of more than four hundred vehicles per hour. AASHTO 
requires a minimum of ten feet of usable shoulder. The 
operative word there may well be usable. During the field 
investigation, he measured the shoulder dimensions on the 
east side of the street and he found that the usable 
shoulder was only five feet, which is deficient under 
AASHTO standards. Beyond that five foot shoulder it is his 
expert opinion, the land slopes steeply and character of 
the material is completely inadequate to give stable 
support to a vehicle which might leave the roadway under 
emergency conditions. Hence he has concluded the balance, 
that perhaps has been referred to by counsel, is not usable 
shoulder for purposes of leaving the roadway in an 
emergency. It is his opinion as an expert that in fact the 
AASHTO standards are the standards in the industry, and in 
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fact I would submit to the court that this is not disputed 
by their own engineering expert, Mr. Becknell, who has 
acknowledged in both his affidavit and testimony that the 
AASHTO standards are governing and it is his opinion that 
the deviation from this standard was a proximate cause of 
the injury. We recognize of course that Mr. Tweedy's 
negligence also contributed to this accident, but the fact 
of the matter is there's a very clear factual dispute as to 
the negligence of the county as well as the causation 
aspects that is present in this case which really precludes 
a summary judgment at this point. I would understand from 
the argument that the issues with reference to the immunity 
defense are not being pursued. I believe there's an 
express waiver of immunity in this case. If Your Honor has 
any questions about that, I would be happy to answer that 
because under the statute, the applicable statute section 
63-30-8, which waives immunity for injuries arising from 
defective unsafe hazardous conditions on roadways—in fact, 
Supreme Court appellate court decisions have specifically 
discussed and found that the discretionary function 
exceptions do not modify or affect in any way that express 
waiver. 
Finally, the only other argument I think that is 
before the court I believe is a technical one. The issue 
was raised with the designation of the Salt Lake County 
r»mbraTTfTVG»'DT»7r'n mBuxicpoTTim 
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Commission, the commissioners as a named party as compared 
to Salt Lake County itself. To briefly address that, I 
would just reiterate that argument advanced in the 
memorandum. The purpose of the pleadings is to give notice 
of the claim and — of the parties. For two years now the 
county has actively defended this case. In fact, in their 
own answer to the amended complaint, they admitted that 
Salt Lake County Commission was the elected and acting 
board of the County of Salt Lake and was charged with 
responsibility for construction, repair, maintenance of the 
county roads, including the subject Wasatch Boulevard. If 
Your Honor so instructs, we have filed a motion to amend 
alternatively which is unopposed, too. We would be happy 
to designate Salt Lake County as a named party with the 
commission or we can leave it as it stands presently. 
Plaintiff believes it is properly designated. The 
commission has been identified, notified. They have 
defended. The county is the real party of interest. 
There's really not a dispute as to that. It is more of a 
technical form of substance type of argument. So if Your 
Honor has any questions as to the other allegations or 
claims, I would be happy to respond. 
THE COURT: Mr. McKnight, are you abandoning the 
immunity argument? 
MR. MCKNIGHT: I believe so. I kind of inherited 
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this case. I am not sure what my previous counsel was 
thinking, so I will not pursue it now. 
THE COURT: Okay. What about the fact that the 
county commissioners become a party? Do you claim 
anything. 
MR. MCKNIGHT: We don't feel it is fatal. We are 
not going to pursue. 
THE COURT: Why don't we substitute county for 
the county commissioners. 
MR. NASH: That would be fine. 
THE COURT: Simply making a record on it, you can 
correct the party defendant. Do you have any response? 
MR. MCKNIGHT: Yes, Your Honor. One 
verification, the county's position is we believe the 
reference to AASHTO standard is a smoke screen. It is not 
a real issue because we feel there's no facts in this case 
that establish the claim, that the plaintiff had any time 
to really consider the shoulder and if he did have time, 
there was adequate escape space for him. As I mentioned 
there was at least six feet of the unused or unblocked 
highway as well as according to the plaintiff's own 
affidavits of nine feet of the shoulder. Any way, fifteen 
feet in all — 
THE COURT: Is there any question but what the 
construction or maintenance of the highway violates the 
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standards? 
MR. MCKNIGHT: That's my next point. I have not 
seen plaintiffs cite to anything that says Salt Lake County 
is — that AASHTO does as a matter of law set any standards 
what is a dangerous condition. Becknell's affidavit says 
it is one of the resources we look to when we construct 
highways, we maintain highways. The Utah Code Annotated 
section 27-12-08.2 and 3, AASHTO applies to newly 
constructed road, not maintained roads. I am not aware of 
anywhere where we maintain a highway we must conform to 
AASHTO standards, which by the way are amended every four 
or five years they are updated, so it is the nature of 
AASHTO that ~ 
THE COURT: Whether there's been a violation of 
the standard or not, do you think there's an issue of 
negligence as to the way they were maintained? 
MR. MCKNIGHT: No. We believe it makes the 
road's condition totally irrelevant, because the facts of 
this accident were so fast paced and quick, the plaintiff 
had no way to consider an escape route. 
THE COURT: Is that something that is established 
by the record or — 
MR. MCKNIGHT: We believe so, Your Honor. The 
only — 
THE COURT: The deposition of Mr. Hart, is that 
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what you are — 
MR. MCKNIGHT: Mr. Hart's affidavit, in fact it 
is incredible what he states, he said he drove to the right 
then he actually turned and crossed his lane into the 
collision. We don't feel like — 
THE COURT: He is claiming there wasn't room 
enough on the right to avoid the accident? 
MR. MCKNIGHT: According to their own expert, 
there was actually nine feet of road edge and shoulder as 
well as the unused portion of the highway. That would make 
at least fifteen feet where he could have escaped and he 
must have saw that, according to their own representation. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I will take the 
matter under advisement, counsel, have you a ruling within 
a day or two. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 
THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Cathy Gallegos, Official Court Reporter in and 
for the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
do hereby certify that the above and foregoing printed 
pages contain a full, true and correct transcription of my 
shorthand notes taken upon the occasion set forth in the 
caption hereof, transcribed by me or under my supervision, 
by means of computer transcription. 
Witness my hand, this 24th day of August, 1992. 
Cathy GaltLagos, Official 
Court Reporter 
Exhibit E 
FILE junty of Salt Lake - State o> >tah FILE NO. f7*f037f£> 
TITLE: (*- PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL (* COUNSEL PRESENT) 
£^M /4^U 
-vs -
/uM^f-'X'(TZLUL^*, ; juts/ 
/O/jJ jtft/Jt/ &-*c+r TJZ' 9^U' /K£,A^,& / 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAILIFF 
M^f J44^Jlt^*-^/ -£* £A-J4*SC&-J-
^Ll 
^ 
'^-jt-u^Jb te^utjiJ— .^ uW-cf{\&&JL 17, itfQo-
 OA^ A~ / 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: DAVID 0. MCKNIGHT (5218) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3421 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. HART 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. TWEEDY, ROBERT B. 
TWEEDY, JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 
10, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF 
UTAH, and SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Defendants. 
Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment came 
on regularly for hearing before the Court, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Court Judge, presiding, on March 9, 1992. 
Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Wm. Kelly Nash; and 
defendant Salt Lake County was represented by their attorney, David 
O. McKnight, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. The Court heard the 
arguments of counsel and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court having reviewed the memoranda filed by the parties, 
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and being 
fully advised in the premises, and having previously issued its 
Minute Order granting summary judgment to defendant Salt Lake 
County upon the grounds that uncontested facts support finding that 
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JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
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Judge James S. Sawaya 
the accident and plaintiff's damages were the result of and soley 
caused by the intervening negligence of defendant Robert L. Tweedy, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that judgment is entered in favor of defendant Salt Lake County. 
The Court finding no reason for delay, directs the entry of 
Judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of Salt Lake County, in 
accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 54(b). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that defendant Salt Lake County recover 
of plaintiff its costs, in the amount of 
DATED this <? day of April, 1992. 
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